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The Privy Council and the Constitutional Legacies of Empire 
Paul F Scott 
 
Abstract: The British Empire is treated as a historical phenomenon, but it enjoys a residual 
existence in the form of the various Overseas Territories of the United Kingdom. This paper 
considers the constitutional position of those Territories. It shows that they are mostly excluded 
from what is called here the ‘domestic’ constitution, having no representation in its institutions 
and when acknowledged, if at all, conceived of as foreign entities. Instead, the Overseas Territories 
are governed mostly via a distinct (post-)imperial constitution, primarily via the mechanism of the 
Privy Council. That institution, which does little work within the domestic constitution, creates a 
formal divide between the domestic and the imperial. This formal divide both masks the 
substantive continuities between the domestic and the imperial constitutions and facilitates, as 
regards the Overseas Territories, forms of governance which would not be tolerated in the imperial 
centre.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The end of the British Empire is usually dated to the handover of Hong Kong to China in July 
1997, but the United Kingdom retains a number of Overseas Territories (‘OTs’) which are best 
understood as the residue of that Empire: wholly distinct from the UK itself but for a number of 
reasons unlikely to join many of the former colonies of the British Empire in achieving 
independence, at least in the near future.1 This article considers how this residue of Empire is 
managed constitutionally, arguing that the answer is to be found in the oft-neglected institution of 
the Privy Council. The Privy Council, which considered from the perspective of what is called here 
the ‘domestic’ constitution – that of the United Kingdom itself – is something of a black hole, is 
doubly central to the management of the residue of Empire. On one hand, the Privy Council is a 
key formal mechanism of governance (understood broadly) for the OTs, which keeps that 
governance separate from the institutional apparatus with which students of the domestic 
constitution are intimately familiar: Parliament, the executive, the domestic courts. 
 
Simultaneously, however, the Privy Council acts as a constitutional firewall separating that 
domestic constitution from the constitution of the residual British Empire. That is, the Privy 
Council ensures a formal (but not substantive) separation of the domestic and imperial 
constitutions. For the most part, the judges who decide disputes from the Overseas Territories are 
those who sit in the Supreme Court, but they do so not in that capacity but rather as members of 
the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. Similarly, within the domestic constitution the 
 
1 See George Drower, ‘A Rethink on Britain’s dependent territories?’ (1989) 78 The Round Table 12, 13 
identifying a move away from the Foreign Office’s policy of allowing independence to those who wanted 
it while not forcing it on undesiring parties. A few years later Drower predicted that the handover of Hong 
Kong would prompt the realisation that the remaining dependent territories (as they were then called) ‘are 
going to provide Britain with colonial responsibilities until well into the next century – possibly forever’: 
George Drower, Britain’s Dependent Territories: A Fistful of Islands, Dartmouth Publishing (1992), x. 
territories are legislated for not usually by the Crown in Parliament but rather the Crown in 
Council: the same individuals who comprise the UK’s executive make policy for the territories, 
but they make it not as Ministers of the Crown but as members of the Privy Council. Rather than 
it being a matter of pure formality, or bare arcana, therefore, a key effect of the ongoing existence 
of the Privy Council is to create an artificial divide between the domestic and the imperial 
constitutions which both hinders the normal processes of democratic accountability and works to 
conceal the residue of the British Empire from the view of those who study the domestic 
constitution. The implication of this account is that reckoning with the Privy Council and its role 
in the British constitutional order is both necessary and difficult precisely because to do so involves 
reckoning with the legacy, and indeed the ongoing reality, of the British Empire.  
 
2. The residual Empire in the domestic constitution 
 
Before turning to the specific role of the Privy Council, it is necessary to consider the nature of 
this residue of the British Empire, and how the constitution of the United Kingdom – the domestic 
constitution – acknowledges and manages (or fails to acknowledge and manage) this artefact. The 
residue in question includes 14 Overseas Territories: Anguilla; Bermuda; the British Antarctic 
Territory; the British Indian Ocean Territory; British Virgin Islands; Cayman Islands; Falkland 
Islands; Gibraltar; Montserrat; Pitcairn Islands; St Helena; Ascension and Tristan da Cunha; Turks 
and Caicos Islands; and the Sovereign Base Areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia on the island of 
Cyprus.2 The position of the Territories into the United Kingdom’s constitutional order is not only 
inadequate, but works both to exclude them from constitutional consciousness and, when that 
fails, to mislead as to their constitutional status. 
 
Of the various ministers within the FCO, the Minister for the Commonwealth, UN and 
South Asia has the greatest level of involvement with the territories, enjoying responsibility for all 
of the Overseas Territories except the Falklands, Gibraltar and the Sovereign Base Areas in 
Cyprus.3 The Falklands and Gibraltar are the responsibility of the Minister of State for Europe and 
the Americas.4 The SBAs, previously said to have been ‘run as military bases, not colonial 
territories’ and for that reason ‘administered by the Ministry of Defence, and not the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office, which administers other Overseas Territories’,5 are now listed amongst 
the responsibilities of the same Minister as are Gibraltar and the Falklands. This division between 
 
2 See Hakeem O Yusuf and Tanzil Chowdhury, ‘The Persistence of Colonial Constitutionalism in British 
Overseas Territories’ (2019) Global Constitutionalism 157. The fullest account of the legal position of the OTs 
is found in Ian Hendry and Susan Dickson, British Overseas Territory Law, 2 ed, Hart Publishing (2018). The 
Territories are to be distinguished from the three Crown dependencies, which were never colonies: the 
Bailiwick of Guernsey, the Bailiwick of Jersey and the Isle of Man. On the constitutional position of the 
Crown Dependencies, see Royal Commission on the Constitution 1969–1973, Report, Vol I, Cmnd 5460 
(1973) and, addressing developments since that report, House of Commons Justice Committee, Crown 
Dependencies (HC 2009-10, 56–I). 
3 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Minister of State (Minister for the Commonwealth, UN and South Asia): 
https://www.gov.uk/government/ministers/minister-of-state-at-the-foreign-commonwealth-office 
(accessed 22 Jan 2020) 
4 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Minister of State (Minister for Europe and the Americas): 
https://www.gov.uk/government/ministers/minister-of-state--14 (. 22 Jan 2020) 
5 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, ‘The Overseas Territories Security, Success and Sustainability’ Cm 
8374 (2012), 117. 
different Ministers not only has the effect of implying a hierarchy between the territories – why 
are most lumped in with the Commonwealth, UN and South Asia even when located very far from 
there, but others given a more accurate geographical representation? – but also means that the 
interests of the Overseas Territories qua Overseas Territories are not represented holistically 
within government. Though they are culturally and geographically disparate, with significant and 
perhaps often overwhelming interest of their own, the OTs are nevertheless a single constitutional 
phenomenon, and the arrangements by which they are represented within the United Kingdom’s 
government obscure that fact. From the point of view of the territories themselves however, the 
problem is a more fundamental one: that it is the Foreign and Commonwealth Office – having 
inherited the responsibilities of the Colonial Office – which deals with them rather than, say, the 
Home Office:  
 
Many people question the very fact that the FCO is the primary interface between the UK 
and its Territories. This stems from the fact that Montserrat and the other Territories are 
legally British Territories and populated for the most part by British citizens. As such, 
Montserrat is neither foreign nor Commonwealth.6 
 
The matter is of long-standing concern to the territories, but has resurfaced recently in the context 
of a consideration of the OTs by the Foreign Affairs Committee, in the process of carrying out its 
first major inquiry into the position of the OTs for more than a decade.7 It is no merely formal 
point, but demonstrates very neatly the manner in which the domestic constitution takes every 
opportunity to place the OTs out of sight and so, politically, out of mind. On the basis of such 
sentiments, the Foreign Affairs Committee has recently recommended that the Government 
‘commission an independent review into cross-government engagement with the OTs and the 
FCO’s management of its responsibilities towards them.’ The review, it suggested, ‘should consider 
alternatives to the FCO and assess the costs, benefits and risks associated with moving primary 
responsibility for the OTs away from the FCO.’8  
 
This, though telling, is by no means the only problem in relations between the centre and 
the periphery. The Westminster Parliament, though no longer thought of as an Imperial 
Parliament, continues to enjoy absolute legislative power over the territories, even those in which 
there exist domestic democratic institutions. Though it ‘tends’ only to legislate in areas such as 
national security and foreign affairs (described by the FAC, in a misleading allusion to the modern 
devolution settlements, as ‘reserved’ to the UK) there is no legal limit upon Parliament legislating 
upon those topics which are, by contrast, ‘devolved’. It will though normally do so only when the 
OTs in question consent to it doing so.9 As with the more constitutionally prominent question of 
the relationship between the Westminster Parliament and the devolved administrations within the 
 
6 Premier of Montserrat, quoted in House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, Global Britain and the 
British Overseas Territories: Resetting the relationship (2017-19, HC 1464), [9]. Not all the Territories are in 
agreement: [11]. 
7 For the previous report, see House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, Overseas Territories (HC  2007-
08, 147-I). See also Foreign and Commonwealth Office, The Overseas Territories Security, Success and 
Sustainability, Cm 8374 (2012). 
8 House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee (n 6) [21]. 
9 House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee (n 6) [26]. 
United Kingdom, much tension is missed by a bare statement of this position. The key modern 
example is the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018, which permits the Foreign 
Secretary to impose upon the Territories (by Order in Council) publicly accessible registers of 
beneficial ownership should the Territories fail to establish such register themselves by the end of 
2020.10 This, it has been noted, is a measure which is understood differently by the UK and the 
Territories, with the former arguing that what the latter see as a purely internal matter in fact 
implicates issues of both foreign policy and national security.11 
 
Even when the system operates without controversy, however, there is of course a major 
difference between the devolved nations and regions and the OTs. The people of the former are 
represented in the Westminster Parliament which retains ultimate sovereignty over them, while the 
latter are not represented either directly or indirectly.12 This too is, predictably, a source of 
frustration for the territories: 
 
The Overseas Territories have no direct representation in Parliament which has ultimate 
authority over its affairs and can pass any law that can impact the Overseas Territories 
disproportionately… A modern relationship requires each OT with a representative 
government to have direct representation in a body that, until independence is obtained, 
can make any law it pleases. There was great support for the Overseas Territories 
legislatures to have a veto power over laws passed by the British Parliament affecting them 
directly in the same way that English MPs have a veto power over laws passed affecting 
England.13 
 
This reference to the EVEL system effectively sets the bar even higher than does implicit 
analogising with the position of the devolved institutions. MPs representing, say, Scottish 
constituencies enjoy (unlike those representing England) no ability to veto within the 
Parliamentary process a hypothetical bill relating to devolved matters in Scotland. But no matter 
where exactly the bar is set, the basic point is that there is no need to decide exactly how to balance 
the views of those representing the interests of the periphery against the views of those 
representing the interests of the centre within the legislative process, for as things stand the former 
are not formally represented at all.14 There is no logical or practical bar to such inclusion, which 
 
10 Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018, s 51. The Foreign Affairs Committee recommended 
that the same path should be taken as regards same-sex marriage if necessary: Foreign Affairs Committee: 
(n 6Error! Bookmark not defined.) [73]. 
11 House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee (n 6) [27]-[33]. 
12 See House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee (n 7) [119]-[126]. 
13 Leader of the Opposition of the British Virgin Islands, cited in House of Commons Foreign Affairs 
Committee (n 6) [35]. See the discussion in Peter Clegg, ‘The United Kingdom and its Overseas Territories: 
No longer a ‘benevolent patron’? (2018) Small States & Territories 149, 158-60. 
14 See the comments in response to a political scandal in the Turks and Caicos Islands: ‘The longer-term 
recommendations contained in the Report seek to limit the scope for ministerial abuse by reducing the 
discretionary powers of ministers and buttressing the existing mechanisms for holding ministers to account, 
such as parliamentary oversight committees, while at the same time introducing new mechanisms of 
accountability in the form of a Freedom of Information Act and an Integrity Commission. There is, 
however, something ultimately paradoxical about seeking to strengthen parliamentary democracy within a 
governing framework where a number of the most important powers are reserved to an unelected and 
locally unaccountable governor who acts at the behest of the UK Government…’ Derek O’Brien and Justin 
occurs in other post-imperial states.15 But nor is there any serious suggestion that this might be 
done, in the short term or at all. The result is that the political concerns which are taken up by the 
United Kingdom are not necessarily those which are most important to the people of its territories, 
while there are occasional projects to impose rules on the Territories without regard to their local 
popularity.16 These sorts of decisions will always have an arbitrary appearance while the processes 
by which the OTs can feed into central decision-making are so weak. Though the United Kingdom 
presents itself as a post-imperial state it retains a degree and form of control over the Territories 
that suggests otherwise. 
 
In its recent report on the OTs, the Foreign Affairs Committee made only the most 
anodyne of recommendations in response to this absence of political representation, saying that  
‘the time is right to give serious consideration to establishing a formal mechanism by which 
members of the Foreign Affairs, Justice, International Development, EFRA and other relevant 
Committees are able collectively to scrutinise the UK Government’s administration of, spending 
on and policies towards the OTs.’17 While such a move might – or might not – improve the quality 
of accountability for the administration of the OTs to Parliament, it would do nothing to address 
the fact that the residents of those Territories, though mostly British citizens, are not represented 
either directly or indirectly in a Parliament which enjoys absolute legal sovereignty over them. This 
is of particular concern given that in many of the OTs those who do not possess some legal status 
particular to each Territory – often described generically as ‘belongership’ – will not be entitled to 
vote in elections to the Territories’ representative institutions, even when they are British Citizens 
or British Overseas Territories Citizens who are permanently resident in the OT in question.18 
Those who are not ‘belongers’ are doubly disenfranchised, represented neither in the institutions 
which exercise day to day control over them nor in those of the United Kingdom in which ultimate 
sovereignty resides. Such deviation from the precepts of  democracy would not be tolerated within 
the domestic constitutional order. 
 
The overall effect, therefore, is that the position of the OTs within the institutions of the 
domestic constitution is, though in the modern era mostly stable, undeniably inadequate. From 
the point of view of the Territories, this is unfortunate: their interests are poorly represented within 
both the executive and legislative branches of the United Kingdom notwithstanding that the power 
it enjoys over them. Though some in the Territories would prefer to resolve the anomaly by 
acquiring greater autonomy rather than by acquiring greater input into the decision-making of the 
imperial centre, desire for full independence from the United Kingdom is mostly limited and such 
 
Leslie, ‘Something rotten in the Turks and Caicos? Britain and its Caribbean Overseas Territories’ [2010] 
Public Law 231, 239. 
15 For example, ‘Overseas France’, which makes up more than 4% of the French population is represented 
by a total of 27 Members of the National Assembly and 21 Senators. 
16 For a recent consideration of the relationship between the UK and the OTs, see Peter Clegg, ‘The United 
Kingdom and its Overseas Territories: No longer a ‘benevolent patron’? (2018) Small States & Territories 
149. An earlier period is considered in Peter Clegg and Peter Gold, ‘The UK Overseas Territories: a decade 
of progress and prosperity?’ (2011) Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 115.  
17 House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee (n 6) [38]. 
18 See the discussion in House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee (n 6) [64]-[67] and, before then, 
House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee (n 7) [269]-[275]. 
independence is unlikely to be forthcoming.19 Some of the Territories are unviable as independent 
states, while others are of such strategic importance that for the United Kingdom to voluntarily 
cede sovereignty is unthinkable.20 And the Territories are not the helpless victims of the United 
Kingdom: though there is in general no funding of the OTs, most benefit quite substantially in 
more or less tangible ways from the relationship. From the perspective of the UK the effect of the 
status quo – the incorporation of the OTs into the domestic constitution either as though they 
were foreign bodies (made the responsibility of the FCO and given no representation in the 
legislature) or not at all – is similarly mixed. The UK is capable of exercising authority over these 
territories without allowing them any direct input into its decision-making, and indeed does so 
where the circumstances are thought to demand it. At the same time, however, the OTs are willing 
and able to make use of the practical latitude which they enjoy in order to act in ways which are 
potentially harmful to the interests of the United Kingdom: the tax haven status of several of the 
Territories – viewed by them as a matter of purely internal significance – is the obvious example. 
In such a way, the status of the OTs reveals itself to be double-edged, disadvantaging not only the 
Territories but also at times the metropole.  
 
For present purposes, however, what matters are not the questions of which set of interests 
are to be privileged and where the balance of convenience lies in relation to the Territories 
individually or collectively. What matters are the reasons for which these questions go mostly 
unasked; the ways in which, that is, the United Kingdom is able to remain an Empire without 
being required to acknowledge that fact directly within its constitutional order. Central to this 
situation is the institution of the Privy Council, the constitutional firewall which operates to 
separate, more or less successfully in its different guises, and in appearance much more than in 
reality, the domestic constitution from its imperial counterpart. 
 
3. The Privy Council  
 
The Privy Council is a black hole at the centre of the British constitution. Any attempt to explain 
its functions tends towards vacuity. For example, the Cabinet Manual informs the reader that the 
Council ‘advises the Sovereign on the exercise of the prerogative powers and certain functions 
assigned to the Sovereign and the Council by Act of Parliament.’21 This practical nothingness 
contrasts with, and may in fact be thought to reflect, the richness of the Privy Council’s history. 
That history is longer than that that of most of the institutions which have usurped it within today’s 
constitution, the Council being a continuation of the Royal Council – the Curia Regis – through 
which governmental power was exercised in the years following the Norman Conquest.22 Dicey, 
noting that the role and functions of this Council had been characterised in a range of – to modern 
 
19 The Foreign Affairs Committee in 2008 noted that only in Bermuda – where independence was rejected 
in a 1995 referendum – did the government favour independence: Foreign Affairs Committee (n 7) [32]. 
20 See FCO (n 5) 22 outlining some of the ways in which the Territories ‘contribute to the security interests 
of the UK and our close allies’. The most obvious example is of course BIOT, discussed further below. 
21 Cabinet Office, The Cabinet Manual A guide to laws, conventions and rules on the operation of government (October 
2011), [1.10]. 
22 On that history, see James Fosdick Baldwin, The King’s Council in England during the Middle Ages, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press (1913) and Edward Raymond Turner, The Privy Council of England in the Seventeenth and 
Eighteenth Centuries, 1603-1784, 2 vols, Johns Hopkins University Press (1927-9). 
eyes – inconsistent ways, argued that such ‘apparent inconsistency… vanishes on closer inspection, 
and throws great light on mediaeval history’: 
 
For the ‘Curia Regis’ possessed every attribute which has been ascribed to it. It was the 
executive. It was also a Law Court. It certainly took part in acts of legislation. Still, at the 
time of its existence it was no anomaly, since to the men of the eleventh century, not the 
combination but the severance of judicial and executive powers would have appeared 
anomalous.23 
 
Nowadays, and as discussed further below, the most prominent element of the Privy Council is 
one which has but a minor domestic significance: the decision-making by the Judicial Committee 
of the Privy Council, mostly in the context of appeals from a (small, and falling) number of mostly 
Commonwealth jurisdictions.24 But the judges who sit on the Committee are only a tiny minority 
of the Privy Council, whose members number upwards of 600.25 They include Ministers of the 
Crown and senior members of other political parties at Westminster,26 the leaders of the devolved 
governments,27 judges of the courts of the various UK jurisdictions,28 and a small number of 
Bishops of the Church of England.29 It is this first category of members which gives the Privy 
Council much of its ongoing constitutional significance, for as a matter of constitutional 
technicality the Cabinet – that ‘hyphen which joins… buckle which fastens, the legislative part of 
the state to the executive part of the state’30 – is a committee of the Privy Council.31 Though this 
overlap is of course unusual if not aberrational, each of these categories is – allowing for certain 
arcane features of the British constitutional order – recognisable as belonging to the three standard 
branches of the state: legislature, executive, and judiciary. In this sense, it is tempting to simply 
treat the Council as a legacy of a pre-modern constitutional order, reflecting – as the Curia Regis 
 
23 AV Dicey, The Privy Council – the Arnold Prize Essay 1860, MacMillan and Co (1887), 7. 
24 Amongst the best guides to the contemporary work of the JCPC is the JCPC itself (see Judicial Committee 
of the Privy Council, ‘Role of the JCPC’: https://www.jcpc.uk/about/role-of-the-jcpc.html) and, though 
now slightly out of date, Andrew Le Sueur  What is the future for the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council?, 
Constitution Unit (2001). On the history of the JCPC, see PA Howell, The Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council 1833-1876: Its Origins, Structure and Development, Cambridge University Press (2008) and Thomas Mohr 
‘‘A British Empire Court’: A Brief Appraisal of the History of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council’ 
in Anthony McElligott et al (eds), Power in History: From Medieval to the Post-Modern World, Irish Academic 
Press (2011). 
25 See the full list on the Privy Council’s website: https://privycouncil.independent.gov.uk/privy-
council/privy-council-members/privy-counsellors/ It is usually noted that the Privy Council is summoned 
in its entirety on only two occasions. One is the demise of the Crown and the succession of a new monarch, 
for which an Accession Council takes place. The other is the announcement by a monarch of his or her 
engagement, which last took place on 23 November 1839 when Queen Victoria announced her engagement 
to Prince Albert of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha. 
26 See Privy Council (n 25)  
27 See Privy Council (n 25), which includes Nicol Sturgeon (FM of Scotland) and Mark Drakeford (FM of 
Wales). 
28 Privy Council (n 25), including a number of Senators of the College of Justice, amongst them Lady Clark 
of Calton, Lord Clarke, Lady Cosgrove, Lady Dorrian etc.  
29 Privy Council (n 25). All those Privy Counsellors in this category appear to be bishops or archbishops of 
the Church of England who sit or have sat in the House of Lords. 
30 Walter Bagehot, The English Constitution, Oxford University Press, reissue (2009), 13 (italics omitted). 
31 As acknowledged by the Cabinet Manual: ‘Cabinet is the executive committee of the Privy Council.’ 
Cabinet Manual (n 21s) [1.14]. 
did for Dicey – a period in which the different branches had yet to developed the separation 
characteristic of enlightenment constitutionalism, and notable – if at all – for demonstrating the 
singular whole out of which our contemporary, partial, institutions grew. And certainly, this role 
is not to be discounted: the Privy Council’s continuing existence does indeed act to remind modern 
observers of the fact that whatever rationalist ordering is perceptible within or constitution was 
not there to begin with, and has as often been imposed on it from outside as emerged organically 
from within.  
 
But several elements of the Council’s membership demonstrate that the institution’s 
present – like its past – goes further than that. One is that the Council is not merely an external 
source of advice to the Crown, in whose name power is exercised, but includes within its 
composition both members of the Royal family32 and members of the Royal household, most 
notably the Queen’s Private Secretary.33 Another, more relevant for present purposes, is that the 
Privy Council’s membership reflects more clearly than perhaps any other institution of the 
domestic constitutional order the United Kingdom’s imperial past. Amongst the more than 600 
members are a number of senior judges and current or former political actors from 
Commonwealth states. One survey suggests that perhaps ten percent of the members fall into this 
category.34 An exhaustive list of those who do so is, however, impossible to provide as the Privy 
Council provides only a list of names in, remarkably, alphabetical order by first name (or, where a 
Counsellor is one form of peer or another, by his or her title).35 The effect is that though the names 
are available, even the most minimal sense of who many of these people are, and why they have 
been appointed to the Counsel requires further, sometimes even extensive, research. Amongst 
those who represent the Commonwealth in one form or another are Ezekiel Alebua, former Prime 
Minster of the Solomon Islands; Doug Anthony, former Deputy Prime Minister of Australia; 
Owen Arthur, former Prime Minister of Barbados. Membership of the Privy Council appears to 
be limited to political figures from the Commonwealth realms, not (for obvious reason) 
encompassing the Commonwealth republics. Not all of the former, however, appear to be so 
represented. 
 
It was noted above how fully the domestic constitution excludes the Overseas Territories, 
acknowledging them – if at all – only in their capacity as ‘other’ and not as part of a persistent 
Empire. Further evidence of this orientation is to be found in the fact that there does not appear 
to be direct or systematic representation of the OTs in the Privy Council, though for the same 
reason that it is difficult to know exactly who is a member of the Privy Council, it is difficult to be 
certain that none of the many hundreds of members was appointed in whole or in part due to his 
or her relationship with one or another of the OTs. This intensifies rather than diminishes the 
problem which we have identified, for – as we shall see below – of the domestic institutions it is 
the Privy Council which exercises the most frequent legislative authority over the OTs. To be clear: 
independent countries which have chosen to retain the monarch as head of state are (mostly) 
 
32 Amongst them the Duke of Edinburgh, the Prince of Wales, the Duchess of Cornwall, and the Duke of 
Cambridge: Privy Council (n 25).  
33 Currently Edward Young CVO. Privy Council (n 25). 
34 David Rogers, By Royal Appointment: Tales from the Privy Council - the unknown arm of Government, Biteback 
Publishing (2015), 291. 
35 Privy Council (n 25). 
represented on the Council, but Territories for whom it makes law are not. They thus have neither 
direct nor indirect representation within the bodies, Parliament and Privy Council, which still in 
large part govern them. The Privy Council, it suffices now to note, is an institution of the United 
Kingdom’s constitution, but one which – unlike the domestic institutions which are an outgrowth 
of it, and which in the modern world mostly obscure it – bears, if subtly and without prominence, 
the marks of the United Kingdom as an imperial power. We see this in a number of ways, almost 
none of which are – not, it is submitted, coincidentally – prominent in the modern constitutional 
literature, within which the Privy Council features either little or at all.   
 
 Though the Privy Council is poorly served by that literature, we can extract from it a 
number of idealised ways of thinking about the body and its contemporary significance. One 
comes from the work of Dicey. Like the majority of the texts which follow it, Dicey’s Introduction 
to the Study of the Law of the Constitution contains no extended discussion of the Privy Council, but 
Dicey had written, early in his career, an essay on the body, which won the Arnold Prize in 1860.36 
Though the essay is largely historical, Dicey commends the study of that history, which is ‘nothing 
else than the account of the rise of all the greatest institutions which make up our national 
constitution’: 
  
Our Parliaments and our Law Courts are but the outgrowth of the Council. In its history 
is seen how not only institutions but ideas assumed their modern form. As we study the 
gradual separation of judicial, political, and administrative functions, it is perceived that the 
notions of ‘Law,’ ‘the State,’ and ‘the Government,’ which now are so impressed on men’s 
minds as almost to bear the delusive appearance of innate ideas, themselves grew up by 
slow degrees; and that the annals of a past age can never be understood till men have 
ceased to apply to them terms and conceptions which are themselves the product of later 
periods.37 
 
This seems true – the Privy Council is the seed from which much, if not all, else grew – and so 
one question for constitutional lawyers is why it still exists within our constitution: a very obvious 
relic of constitutional history but not one which has yet been discarded altogether, nor even 
reduced to an entirely formal role.  
 
Recent literature has paid significant critical attention to the Imperial context of Dicey’s 
writings.38 Considered in that light, it is notable that though the history of the Privy Council is told 
by him up to the reign of William IV, Dicey has little to say of its involvement in the governance 
of the British Empire, though such governance was in the past a major aspect of its work, much 
of it through that committee known more formally as the Lords of Trade and Plantations and 
 
36 Dicey (n  23). In a preface, explaining that he has not updated the essay for its republication, Dicey terms 
it ‘a youthful and immature attempt to sketch out the development of a great institution.’  
37 Dicey (n 23) 146-7. 
38 See Dylan Lino, ‘The rule of law and the rule of empire: A.V. Dicey in imperial context’ (2018) 81 Modern 
Law Review 739 and ‘Albert Venn Dicey and the Constitutional Theory of Empire’ (2016) 36 Oxford Journal 
of Legal Studies 751. 
more commonly as the Board of Trade.39 Other leading considerations of the modern domestic 
constitution make little if any reference to the Council, though it has often been suggested as a 
possible solution to some new or newly apprehended constitutional dilemma. JDB Mitchell, for 
example, argued that the Privy Council (‘and I emphasise that I do not mean the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council’) should be given a new administrative jurisdiction, like that of 
the French Conseil d’Etat, in recognition of the weakness of Parliamentary control of 
administration.40 Tony Benn had earlier argued that it should replace the House of Lords.41 More 
recent discussion considered whether the Monarch, in granting Royal Assent to Bills passing both 
the House of Commons and the House of Lords, was acting on the advice of the executive of the 
day or the Privy Council, or neither.42 There is then, a sense that when we find ourselves discussing 
the Privy Council in its contemporary rather than historical role, something must already have 
gone wrong: we must, by definition, be in the realm of (perhaps slightly fevered) speculation, 
casting around for a deus ex machina by which one constitutional anomaly will resolve the problems 
caused by another. 
 
All of which is to reaffirm that there is, in the ordinary course of events, a remarkable lack 
of attention paid to the Council. Post-Dicey, Sir Almeric FitzRoy, Clerk to the Privy Council, 
published a history of it in 1928.43 A few years ago, David Rodgers, a political advisor (including 
to William Whitelaw when he was Lord President of the Council), published a book about the 
Council.44 That book – by virtue, it would seem, of its sheer novelty (a novelty on which the book 
trades openly) –  was reviewed by Martin Loughlin in the pages of the London Review of Books.45 
Loughlin contests Rodgers’ implicit endorsement of ‘FitzRoy’s claim that the Privy Council 
triumphantly vindicates Tocqueville’s observation that “forms are the fortresses of liberty”’: 
 
39 See the overview in HE Egerton, ‘The Seventeenth and Eighteen Century Privy Council in its Relations 
with the Colonies’ (1925) 7 Journal of Comparative Legislation and International Law 1. The Board of Trade, 
having been largely dormant in the second half of the twentieth century, was convened once more in 2017, 
though to no obvious effect. 
40 ‘It is I believe necessary to start at that level for a variety of reasons. First, that it is essential that any new 
body should be a United Kingdom tribunal, and at that level any difficulties founded upon the Acts of 
Union would be overcome… Secondly, since the court will in some senses be a novelty, it is necessary to 
start it off sufficiently high up the tree to give it strength. To start lower would be to ensure that the 
enterprise were still-born. Thirdly it is likely that to start it there would be to increase the chances of 
acceptability by the civil service. Fourthly, by locating it there it would be easiest to secure the mixed 
composition of lawyers, administrators and others which is essential.’ JDB Mitchell, ‘The Constitutional 
Implications of Judicial Control of the Administration in the United Kingdom’ (1967) 25 Cambridge Law 
Journal 46, 55. 
41 Anthony Wedgwood Benn, The Privy Council as a Second Chamber, Fabian Society (1957). Benn, at 18, noted 
that the ‘characteristic of public service’ was one of those elements which distinguished the Privy Council 
from the House of Lords. Because membership of the Privy Council was much more common amongst 
Peers of first creation than amongst those holding inherited titles, turning the Council into the second 
chamber mean that ‘all but a very few peers now sitting by their inheritance would have been swept away, 
and the exceptions would all be men who had earned their Privy Councillorship by public service’  
42 See Robert Craig, ‘Could the Government Advise the Queen to Refuse Royal Assent to a Backbench 
Bill?’ UK Constitutional Law Association Blog (22 January 2019) and the comments in response, especially 
that of Sir Stephen Sedley. 
43 Almeric FitzRoy, The History of the Privy Council, Murray (1928). 
44 Rogers (n 34). It is perhaps telling that there is only one index reference for the OTs in the body of the 
book, and that the discussion to which it refers is in fact a discussion of the Crown Dependencies. 
45 Martin Loughlin, ‘What’s it for?’, 37 London Review of Books 29 (22 October 2015).  
 This kind of Whiggism overlooks the radical change in the Privy Council’s function from 
instrument of monarchical government in a law-framed constitution to instrument of 
parliamentary government operating through conventional understandings. Tacitus is 
closer to the mark. The secret of establishing a new state, he says, is to maintain the forms 
of the old.46  
 
That is, the Privy Council has contributed to the emergence of modern democracy by providing a 
stable form within which the underlying substances has been able to evolve. Though both 
FitzRoy’s and Loughlin’s claims are superficially plausible, the length of time between their 
articulation is indicative of the level of attention paid to the Council by constitutional scholars. 
The resulting gap in our understanding is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that the Interpretation 
Act 1978 defines ‘The Privy Council’ in a fashion so circular as to border on the absurd: it means, 
we are told, ‘the Lords and others of Her Majesty’s Most Honourable Privy Council’.47  
 
It is perhaps tempting for the domestic constitutional lawyer to simply note this lacuna 
and move on; to explicitly confine the Privy Council to the realm of the dignified,48 or to go further 
and to say that though it is interesting it holds no significance for us as modern constitutional 
lawyers – we should pay as much attention to it as we do to, say, the Lord Chamberlain, or the 
Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. Once the question is considered from the point of view of the 
United Kingdom as an imperial or post-imperial state, however, we see that this temptation must 
be resisted. Regardless of how it originated, and regardless of what it now means and does not 
mean for and within the domestic constitution, the Privy Council reflects very directly (perhaps, 
though nothing turns on it, more directly than does any other aspect of the contemporary 
constitution) the legacies of the British Empire. To confront the anomalies of the Privy Council is 
to confront the United Kingdom’s unambiguous imperial past and, more importantly, its 
ambiguous imperial present. And so, conversely, the willingness to tolerate the constitutional 
anomaly of the Privy Council – the fact that rather than seeking to understand it and to mitigate 
some of its more obnoxious features, we (constitutional lawyers, but also the public more 
generally) are almost always content to ignore it – indicates the absence of any felt need to confront 
that legacy. In the following sections I make that case by considering the roles that the Privy 
Council plays in the governance of the residue of the British Empire, showing – in each case – 
that the formal institutional distinction mask a substantive continuity; that the Privy Council, and 
the imperial constitution of which it forms part, is not a distinct order, but rather the shadow of 
the domestic constitution.   
 
46 Loughlin (n 45). 
47 Patrick O’Connor, The Constitutional Role of the Privy Council and the Prerogative, JUSTICE (2009) 4. 
48 See Peter Billings and Ben Pontin, ‘Prerogative powers and the Human Rights Act: elevating the status 
of Orders in Council’ [2001] Public Law 21, 26 and 27 discussing the designation of prerogative Orders in 
Council as ‘primary legislation’ in the Human Rights Act: ‘What cannot escape comment, however, is the 
profoundly arbitrary nature of the application of the Act to some prerogative powers, but not others. It is 
particularly difficult to justify the amenability to judicial challenge (on human rights grounds) of a 
declaration of war, or a withholding of a passport, depending on the involvement of the Privy Council – in 
most other respects a titular, dignified institution of the constitution’ and ‘what can be more arbitrary than 
to attribute novel legal significance to the Privy Council, an ancient institution which has hitherto evolved 
into a largely dignified aspect of the British constitution?’ 
 4. The judicial role of the Privy Council  
 
The element of the Privy Council which is most familiar to contemporary observers is the Judicial 
Committee. Though the Committee was formally constituted only by the Judicial Committee Act 
1833, the principle that statute reflects is much older: 
 
The practice of invoking the exercise of the royal prerogative by way of appeal from any 
Court in His Majesty’s Dominions has long obtained throughout the British Empire… In 
the United Kingdom the appeal was made to the King in Parliament, and was the 
foundation of the appellate jurisdiction of the House of Lords; but in His Majesty’s 
Dominions beyond the seas the method of appeal to the King in Council has prevailed, 
and is open to all the King’s subjects in those Dominions.49 
 
The judicial element of the Council was attested in a variety of other ways: the courts of both 
common law and chancery were originally elements of the Privy Council, exercising the King’s 
prerogative to dispense justice, and remained that way until replaced by the High Court and the 
Court of Appeal following the enactment of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1873.50 The 
1833 Act, which in creating the Judicial Committee reaffirmed that ‘from the decisions of various 
courts of judicature in the East Indies, and in the plantations, and colonies and other dominions 
of His Majesty abroad, an appeal lies to His Majesty in Council’, does not create a judicial body as 
we would normally understand it. Rather it perpetuates the prior situation in which the judgment 
of the JCPC is not in fact a legal determination, but rather advice to the sovereign as to the 
judgment that should be made.51 An Act of 1844 created the power ‘to provide for the admission 
of any appeal or appeals to Her Majesty in Council from any judgments… of any court of justice 
within any British colony or possession abroad…52 In an evocative account of the JCPC, Viscount 
Haldane suggested that its real work was ‘that of assisting in holding the Empire together.’53 
 
That element of the Committee’s jurisdiction which is most prominent is that by which it 
acts as a court of final appeal for a number of Commonwealth jurisdictions, both monarchies 
 
49 Nadan v The King [1926] AC 482, 491-2. 
50 ‘The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council is basically a court of law, exercising, as I have tried to 
explain, by delegation the residual powers of the Curia Regis remaining attached to the Crown after the 
Courts of Common Law and Chancery had been hived off and the jurisdiction of the Papal Curia and 
various other statutory jurisdictions had been added.’ HL Deb (21 April 1971) vol 317 cols 754-72 (The 
Lord Chancellor). 
51 Judicial Committee Act 1833, s 3. Minty noted in 1947 that ‘for centuries their advice has always been 
accepted, and the reading of their decision at a Court at St. James’s Palace some weeks later is a mere 
picturesque formality’: LM Minty, ‘The Privy Council: New Issues Arise in the British Commonwealth’ 
(1947) 33 American Bar Association Journal 1016, 1017 
52 Judicial Committee Act 1844, s 1. 
53 Viscount Haldane, ‘The Work for the Empire of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council’ (1922) 1 
Cambridge Law Journal 143, 154. He continued: ‘My own view is that it is a disappearing body, but that it will 
be a long time before it will disappear altogether… [A]t present we have constant indications that we are a 
useful body in vast regions where it is not always easy to get a common point of view. Our function is not 
to claim any fresh rights to interfere, but to act as statesmen should, being willing to help if called in, but 
not pressing assistance where assistance is not desired.’ 
(Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Cook Islands and Niue (Associated States of New Zealand), 
Grenada, Jamaica, St Christopher and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and 
Tuvalu) and republics (the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, Mauritius, and Kiribati – the 
jurisdiction in relation to the latter being very limited).54 Geographically broad and diverse as these 
jurisdictions are, this represents a significantly lesser reach that was once possessed by the Privy 
Council: Pollock noted early in the twentieth century that ‘no other Court in the world has a 
jurisdiction of such variety and complexity’.55 It was ‘at its height’ in the period following the First 
World War, ‘at a time when almost all the Overseas Territories acquired by Great Britain during 
the period of her expansion still remained intact as an integral part of the British Empire and when 
Great Britain had in addition accepted from the League of Nations a Mandate for a number of ex-
enemy colonies and possessions.’56 Though the largest of the Commonwealth states have abolished 
the Privy Council’s jurisdiction thereover – something first made possible by the Statute of 
Westminster, which provided that henceforth no act of a Dominion parliament would be ‘void or 
inoperative on the ground that it is repugnant to the law of England, or to the provisions of any 
existing or future Act of Parliament of the United Kingdom’57 – what remains is nevertheless a 
very obvious reminder of the UK’s imperial past.58 
 
From the perspective of the present study, however, another aspect of the JCPC’s work is 
more directly relevant – that which relates to the UK’s Overseas Territories,59 including the 
Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus.60 Where the Committee’s Commonwealth jurisdiction reflects the 
UK’s imperial past, this jurisdiction is better understood as representing its imperial present. 
Though it attracts far less attention than does the jurisdiction over Commonwealth realms and 
republics, this elements of the JCPC’s jurisdiction is by no means marginal. To take first the 
Overseas Territories, the following are figures for the number of cases relating to these places 
decided between 2010 and 2019:61 
 
 
54 See Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (n 24). There are also a number of – mostly rather arcane – 
domestic jurisdictions, including (for example) appeals from the Disciplinary Committee of the Royal 
College of Veterinary Surgeons, and appeals from the Court of Admiralty of the Cinque Ports.   
55  F Pollock, ‘The Jurisdiction of the Privy Council’ (1906) 7 Journal of the Society of Comparative Legislation 
330, 332. 
56 HH Marshall, ‘The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council: A Waning Jurisdiction’ (1964) 13 ICLQ 697, 
698.  
57 Statute of Westminster 1931, s 2(2). 
58 A second of the JSPC’s jurisdictions is of constitutional interest, though no special relevance to Empire 
past or present: section 4 of the Judicial Committee Act 1833 permits the Monarch (acting, presumably, on 
advice from the executive) to refer to the Committee ‘for hearing or consideration any such other matters 
whatsoever as His Majesty shall think fit’, in which event the Committee ‘shall thereupon hear or consider 
the same, and shall advise His Majesty thereon in manner aforesaid.’ Though relatively little use has been 
made of the provision this sort of advisory jurisdiction is of course wholly (perhaps entirely) distinctive in 
the United Kingdom’s legal orders. It provides, a Lord Chancellor once said, ‘a convenient method of 
ascertaining the law when no other jurisdiction is available’. HL Deb 21 April 1971, vol 317 col 769 (Lord 
Chancellor).  
59 Anguilla, Bermuda, British Antarctic Territory, British Indian Ocean Territory, British Virgin Islands, 
Cayman Islands, Falkland Islands, Gibraltar, Montserrat, Pitcairn Islands, St Helena, Ascension and Tristan 
da Cunha, Turks and Caicos Islands. 
60 Identified separately by the JCPC: Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (n 24). 
61 Figures my own. 
Year Number of cases decided 
2010 8  
2011 4  
2012 3  
2013 13  
2014 11  
2015 9  
2016 11 
2017 7  
2018 6  
2019 8  
 
The number of cases from each overseas territory is as follows: 
 
Overseas Territory Number of cases decided 
Anguilla 5 
Bermuda 23 
British Antarctic Territory 0 
British Indian Ocean Territory 0 
British Virgin Islands 28 
Cayman Islands 14 
Falkland Islands 0 
Gibraltar 6 
Montserrat 2 
Pitcairn Islands 1 
St Helena, Ascension and Tristan da Cunha 0 
Turks and Caicos Islands 9 
Sovereign Base Areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia 1 
 
In 2013, the year with the highest number of decided cases from the OTs, such cases represented 
more than a third (34) of those decided by the JCPC. This is, it bears repeating, not a marginal or 
secondary aspect of the JCPC’s jurisdiction – indeed, given the very small populations of most of 
the OTs, it is probably a much higher per capita recourse to the Committee than is made by any 
of the Commonwealth states for which it continues to act as a final court of appeal.  
 
But these figures are high not only as a proportion of the JCPC’s work. They are high also 
as a proportion of the work of the UK Supreme Court, which in that same year (2013) decided 81 
cases. To spell out the obvious: it makes a certain amount of sense to separate the work of the 
courts in relation to the ‘undivided realm’ from that of other states, and so it is not inherently 
illogical, considered in historical context, to have two bodies doing such similar work. It is, 
however, less obviously reasonable for the OTs to be dealt with by the latter (the JCPC) rather 
than by the former (the Supreme Court). Indeed, this might be thought to be the judicial equivalent 
of the lamented arrangements discussed above, whereby the OTs relate to the United Kingdom 
via the Foreign and Commonwealth Office rather than the Home Office. If such a change were 
made – that is, if appeals from the OTs went to the UKSC rather than the JCPC – we could crudely 
estimate that they would in at least some years account for more than 10 per cent of the Supreme 
Court’s work. In such a situation, the ongoing imperial nature of the United Kingdom would be 
far more difficult to overlook than is currently the case. It would be present on the website of the 
highest court in the land (rather than a separate site), the cases tweeted out by it (the JCPC does 
not have its own twitter feed, and the UKSC’s does not routinely tweet about the judgments of its 
alter ego).  
 
The effect, then, is that the Privy Council acts as a constitutional firewall which separates 
the United Kingdom – the post-imperial state, with a domestic constitution which is post-imperial 
– from its reality as an ongoing imperial entity. For, of course, these are not in substance two 
different entities: the same individuals who act as Justices of the Supreme Court on one floor of 
the old Middlesex Guildhall move to a different floor of that same building to act in their capacity 
as members of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council when deciding cases which arrive from 
the Overseas Territories. The Privy Council is a formal barrier which disguises the substantive 
identity of the body at work and allows the UK to maintain two constitutions in operation 
simultaneously: one domestic and another imperial. 
 
5. The legislative role of the Privy Council.  
 
The same dynamic which characterises the judicial role of the Privy Council is evident also in its 
legislative role in relation to the OTs: issue of form work to create an artificial divide, disguising 
the substantive reality whereby the government of the United Kingdom legislates, through the 
Council, for a residual Empire. The starting point is that the Territories in most cases have 
representative institutions of their own. Parliament, however – still an imperial Parliament – retains 
the unfettered right to legislate for the Territories as and when it sees fit, notwithstanding the lack 
of democratic representation therein discussed above. In practice, it does not often do so. Instead, 
law is made for the Territories by the Privy Council. The formal legislator is not the ‘Queen in 
Parliament’ but rather the ‘Queen in Council’.  
 
There are two primary forms of legislation for which the Queen in Council is formally 
responsible. Though both are ‘Orders in Council’, one is statutory in nature, the other 
prerogative.62 Statutory orders in council are a form of ‘statutory instrument’ to which the 
provisions of the Statutory Instruments Act 1946 apply. 63 The key consequence of being so 
designated is that SIs must be published. That secondary legislation is a SI does not in itself 
determine that it must be laid before Parliament nor the extent (if any) of parliamentary scrutiny 
 
62 A separate form of secondary legislation – which can be either statutory or prerogative – is the order of 
(rather than ‘in’) council, which is as a matter of law made by the Privy counsellors themselves rather than 
the Monarch. Most such orders relate to the regulation of professions in the medical field. 
63 Statutory Instruments Act 1946, s 1 – the act applies where ‘power to make, confirm or approve orders, 
rules, regulations or other subordinate legislation is conferred on His Majesty in Council or on any Minister 
of the Crown’ either ‘by this Act or any Act passed after the commencement of this Act’. Statutory Orders 
in Council made under authority which predates the coming into force of the 1946 Act are not necessarily 
statutory instruments and so are not subject to the requirements of the 1946 Act, but only those of the 
parent act (which may in practice be broadly equivalent). 
that it undergoes, both of which are determined by the parent act. Though they differ in their 
conception from other types of statutory instrument – being made by the Queen in Council, 
usually with the Lord President of the Council and three other of its members present64 – statutory 
orders in council do not necessarily raise any great issues of constitutional principle: Parliament, 
after all, has empowered their making. Nevertheless, the use of such orders to legislate for the OTs 
– even to provide them with constitutions, which Parliament has in the past not done directly but 
rather empowered the Crown in Council to do – is deeply unsatisfactory. In most cases the relevant 
orders in council are not subject to the normal processes of Parliamentary scrutiny, and so the 
requirement that they be printed is the sole obligation.65 Even in the case of orders in council 
creating constitutions for the Territories, the usual obligation is solely to lay them before 
Parliament, and that does not apply in all cases.66 That Parliament is denied the oversight role it 
would ordinarily play in the making of secondary legislation might be considered less significant 
in light of modern understandings of how weak is that oversight, both in its negative and 
affirmative forms,67 but the principle must be insisted upon. There should be scrutiny, guaranteed 
by law, and yet the forms of the Privy Council work, very often, to evade that requirement, 
obscuring a practice that would not be accepted in other circumstances.68  
 
The second form of order in council, more significant both for present purposes and from 
the point of view of constitutional principle, is the prerogative order in council.69 Such orders do 
not fall within the definition of statutory instruments in the 1946 Act, and so are not subject to 
the rules as to publication: as discussed further below, they are often not published in a form 
 
64 Michael Everett, The Privy Council, House of Commons Library Briefing Paper CBP7460 (8 February 
2016) 14: ‘The Privy Council meets on average about once a month, and these meetings are held in the 
presence of the Queen. Only current Government Ministers (themselves Privy Counsellors) attend these 
meetings. The quorum for a meeting of the Privy Council is three Privy Counsellors, although four 
Ministers usually attend each meeting. One of these is the Lord President of the Council.’ 
65 See Hendry and Dickson (n 2) 60-3 discussing the various ways in which both the constitutions of the 
OTs and the statutes under which those constitutions are (mostly) made reserve the legislative power of 
the Queen in Council.  
66 They do not apply to Anguilla or the SBAs: Foreign Affairs Committee (n 7) [28]. At [27]-[30] the 
Committee notes the informal processes which exist in order to permit the Committee sight of constitution 
orders (but not others) before they are made. 
67 See, for example, Adam Tucker, ‘Parliamentary Scrutiny of Delegated Legislation’ in A Horne and G 
Drewry (eds), Parliament and the Law, Hart Publishing (2018). 
68 The other issue raised by statutory orders in council relates to the question of when it is considered 
appropriate to empower the making of statutory instruments which take that form rather than, for example, 
some other type of secondary legislation. Certain secondary legislative powers invariably provide for the 
making of such orders – powers, for example, to extend the force of legislation to the Channel Islands or 
the Isle of Man – but it is unclear what (if any) specific principles account for the decision to employ it 
elsewhere. One suggestion is that ‘[i]t is more dignified and impressive for an independence constitution, 
or an instrument giving effect to an extradition treaty or creating new parliamentary constituencies or 
altering electoral boundaries, to be made by Her Majesty in Council.’ Stanley De Smith & Rodney Brazier, 
Constitutional and Administrative Law, 1994, p161 quoted in Michael Everett, The Privy Council, House of 
Commons Library Briefing Paper CBP7460 (8 February 2016), 6. O’Connor glosses this point as meaning 
that the use of orders in council is ‘purely cosmetic.’: Patrick O’Connor, The Constitutional Role of the Privy 
Council and the Prerogative, Justice (2009). Reliance upon statutory orders in council therefore would seem to 
indicate, in general terms, the constitutional significance of what is being provided for. 
69  ‘Prerogative Orders in Council are anachronistic because in substance they are executive legislation made 
without parliamentary approval or scrutiny.’ Richard Moules, ‘Judicial Review of Prerogative Orders in 
Council: Recognising the Constitutional Reality of Executive Legislation’ (2008) 67 CLJ 12. 
accessible to the public at large, or even in some cases at all. Nor, being non-statutory in nature, 
can a parent act impose procedural obligations upon the legislating body – there is in relation to 
such orders no parent act. Prerogative orders in council therefore can and do come into force 
without having been published by HMSO and without Parliament having been given sight of them, 
quite apart from being given the opportunity to scrutinise and perhaps even reject them.  
 
The scope of what might be done via prerogative order in council in the United Kingdom 
itself has been severely limited for several centuries. Most authorities trace the limitation to the 
decision in the Case of Proclamations, and Coke’s dictum that ‘the King cannot change any part of 
the common law, nor create any offence by his proclamation, which was not an offence before, 
without Parliament.’70 Proclamations could only go with the grain of the existing law, and not 
against it.71 Such orders therefore were – and are – in that sense not always truly legislative. But 
Coke’s dictum, it transpires, applies (at least in its fullest form) only to England and later the United 
Kingdom. As with the rule in Entick v Carrington, 72 the great principles of English common law 
are, it would seem, geographically constrained, and the outside – the Overseas Territories included 
– is constituted as a necessarily inferior ‘other’. That is, amongst those few genuinely legislative 
acts which might still be done by prerogative order in council are – crucially – the making of law 
for the Overseas Territories. Prerogative legislation remains a key tool for the governance of the 
residual British Empire notwithstanding that it has dwindled almost to nothing within the domestic 
constitution.  
 
The prerogative encompasses in the first a power to make constitutions for the Overseas 
Territories. This power has been augmented (rather than placed in abeyance) by statute,73 with the 
majority of the OTs being subject to constitutions made on the basis of one or the other statute.74 
The points made above about the procedural deficiencies of many statutory orders in council – 
not required even to be laid before Parliament – apply also to orders in council creating 
constitutions for those Territories where there is no statutory basis for doing so; where they are, 
that is, prerogative orders in council.75 The OTs in this category are Gibraltar and BIOT. Their 
constitutions were made solely under the prerogative, with the prerogative to make ‘ordinary’ law 
 
70 Case of Proclamations (1610) 12 Co Rep 74. See also The Zamora [1916] 2 AC 77. For discussion of these 
cases in relation to the prerogative, see Glendon A Schubert, Jr, ‘Judicial Review of Royal Proclamations 
and Orders-in-Council’ (1951) 9 The University of Toronto Law Journal 69. The implications of this element of 
Case of Proclamations were of course considered in recent times by the Supreme Court in R (Miller) v Secretary 
of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5. 
71 ‘These proclamations have then a binding force, when… they are grounded upon and enforce the laws 
of the realm. For, though the making of laws is entirely the work of a distinct part, the legislative branch, 
of the sovereign power, yet the manner, time, and circumstances of putting those laws in execution must 
frequently be left to the discretion of the executive magistrate. And therefore his constitutions or edicts, 
concerning these points, which we call proclamations, are binding upon the subject, where they do not 
either contradict the old laws, or tend to establish new ones; but only enforce the execution of such laws 
as are already in being, in such manner as the king shall judge necessary.’ Blackstone, Commentaries, I, 270. 
72 See Paul F Scott, The National Security Constitution, Hart Publishing (2018), 270-3. 
73 The British Settlement Acts 1887 and 1945. 
74 Hendry and Dickson (n 2) 14-5. 
75 Though as Hendry and Dickson (n 2) 20 note, this is true also of some constitution orders made under 
statutory authority, while even those statutory orders which do require to be laid before Parliament need 
be so laid only after being made and are not subject to either the negative or affirmative procedures. 
explicitly reserved in the relevant orders. Moreover, a continuing power to legislate by order in 
council (deriving ‘at least in part’ from an Act of Parliament)76 is reserved in relation to all of the 
Territories other than Bermuda and the SBAs.77 Without such reservation, as we shall see shortly, 
the creation of representative bodies in a territory would suffice to deprive the Queen in Council 
of the power to legislate under the prerogative. 
 
To explain briefly the position of parliament and prerogative as regards colonies: the 
common law distinguished between those which were settled, to which English law would apply 
without further action, and those which were ceded or conquered, in which existing laws would 
apply until changed.78 Those changes might be made by either Parliament or Crown. In Campbell v 
Hall,79 Lord Mansfield gave an influential account of the legal position of colonies acquired by 
conquest, starting from the proposition that a country ‘conquered by the British arms becomes a 
dominion of the King in the right of his Crown; and, therefore, necessarily subject to the 
Legislature, the Parliament of Great Britain’.80 He emphasised that though the King was permitted 
to legislate for a conquered territory, his legislation was necessarily inferior and subject to limits 
which did not apply to Parliament: 
 
… if the King (and when I say the King, I always mean the King without the concurrence 
of Parliament,) has a power to alter the old and to introduce new laws in a conquered 
country, this legislation being subordinate, that is, subordinate to his own authority in 
Parliament, he cannot make any new change contrary to fundamental principles…81 
 
In normal circumstances, therefore, a conquered colony was subject to these dual authorities: one 
absolute and one limited, however slightly and however imprecisely. In Campbell, however, 
Mansfield held that though the King generally had authority to make laws for conquered territories, 
he had in respect of Grenada handed it over to a representative assembly and a Governor. For 
that reason, a later attempt to impose taxation via the prerogative was void.82 The exercise of the 
prerogative to empower the legislature to make laws for the colony operated as a ratchet, which 
could be done but not undone by the Crown. Once so empowered, the local legislature could have 
its power diminished only by the imperial Parliament.  
 
Once a colonial legislature existed, the question necessarily arose of the relationship 
between its laws and those of England. The basic rule was widely understood to be that colonial 
 
76 Hendry and Dickson (n 2) 59. 
77 Hendry and Dickson (n 2) 60. 
78 ‘[I]f an uninhabited country be discovered and planted by English subjects, all the English laws then in 
being, which are the birthright of every subject, are immediately there in force... Such colonists carry with 
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laws were void if ‘repugnant’ to the laws of England, though there was significant uncertainty as 
to the practical meaning of that rule, and – in particular – whether the law in question included 
only legislation of the imperial Parliament or encompassed also rules of the English common law.83 
Lord Mansfield’s bare reference, in the passage from Campbell v Hall quoted above, to ‘fundamental 
principles’ had muddied the waters, and judges in some of the colonies were keen to exploit the 
ambiguity.84 The difficulty was resolved – in part – by the Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865, whose 
long title states its intention as being ‘to remove Doubts as to the Validity’ of the laws in question. 
The Act, for present purposes, does a number of things. First, it confirms the inferiority of colonial 
law to the laws of the imperial legislature, whether primary or secondary.85 From now on, colonial 
law was void if ‘repugnant’ to Acts of the imperial Parliament or their equivalent, but not 
otherwise.86 Loose and uncertain talk of fundamental principles of the common law was no longer 
a threat to the validity of laws made by colonial legislatures. 
 
The meaning of the 1865 Act has been explored in a number of cases, most importantly 
Bancoult, which pertains to (what is now) the British Indian Ocean Territory. The Territory, often 
known as the Chagos Islands, was famously (and disgracefully) depopulated in the 1960s in order 
to permit the construction of a US naval base.87 In Bancoult (No 1) it was held  that the Immigration 
Ordinance 1971 by which that depopulation was effected – made under the British Indian Ocean 
Territory Order 1965, a prerogative order in council – was unlawful. An order in effect exiling the 
population could not be said to be made ‘for the peace order and good government’ of the 
territory.88 When the Government responded with a new Order in Council – the British Indian 
Ocean Territory (Constitution) Order 2004 – it argued that prerogative orders in council, being 
 
83 See the discussion in Anne Twomey, ‘Fundamental Common Law Principles as Limitations Upon 
Legislative Power’ (2009) 9 Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal 47. 
84 Many of the doubts were the result of the decision-making of a single judge, Benjamin Boothby, who 
repeatedly held constitutional laws to be void in accordance with Lord Mansfield’s dictum in Campbell v 
Hall: see DB Swinfen, Imperial Control of Colonial Legislation, 1813-65: A Study of British Policy Towards Colonial 
Legislative Powers, Oxford University Press (1970). 
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authority of such Act of Parliament, or having in the colony the force and effect of such Act, shall be read 
subject to such Act, order, or regulation, and shall, to the extent of such repugnancy, but not otherwise, be 
and remain absolutely void and inoperative.’ CLVA 1865, s 2. 
86 ‘No colonial law shall be or be deemed to have been void or inoperative on the ground of repugnancy to 
the law of England, unless the same shall be repugnant to the provisions of some such Act of Parliament, 
order, or regulation as aforesaid.’ CLVA 1865, s 3. 
87 See, amongst a voluminous literature, Stephen Allen, The Chagos Islanders and International Law, Hart 
Publishing (2014) and Stephen Allen and Chris Monaghan, Fifty Years of the British Indian Ocean Territory: Legal 
Perspectives, Springer (2018). The reason for the depopulation was the construction of a military base, on 
which see David Vine, Island of Shame: The Secret History of the U.S. Military Base on Diego Garcia, Princeton 
University Press (2011). 
88 R v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, ex parte Bancoult [2000] EWHC Admin 413. It was 
argued here that the Queen’s Bench Division had no jurisdiction to make the order sought, there existing 
a separate court structure for BIOT in which it could be challenged. The Divisional Court rejected the claim 
that the Order in Council was an act of the Government of BIOT rather than that of the United Kingdom, 
with Laws LJ saying (at [28]) that it represented ‘an abject surrender of substance to form’: ‘Nothing is 
plainer… that the making of the Ordinance and its critical provision, section 4, were done on the orders or 
at the direction of Her Majesty's ministers here, Her ministers in right of the government of the United 
Kingdom.’ 
acts of the Queen in Council, were immune from judicial review. At first instance, the Divisional 
Court rejected this, holding that the decision to make the 2004 Order ‘was in reality that of the 
Secretary of State, not of Her Majesty’ and so could be challenged by way of judicial review ‘in the 
ordinary way.’89 The Colonial Laws Validity Act, being concerned only with repugnancy, did not 
prevent the review of the Order on rationality grounds,90 and the claim that the Order was indeed 
irrational was accepted by the High Court.91  
 
 The conclusion as to the implications of the 1865 Act were challenged on appeal, where it 
was argued that the effect of that Act was that an order in council applicable to the colonies could 
be challenged only on the basis of its repugnancy to an imperial statute and on no other grounds. 
Crucial here was that the ‘colonial laws’ whose status was clarified in 1865 were defined in the Act 
to include ‘laws made for any colony… by Her Majesty in Council’.92 Sedley LJ was sceptical as to 
the logic of this inclusion, suggesting that it was a ‘fair inference’ that orders in council ‘were 
included by the parliamentary draftsman in the definition of colonial laws in s.1 for completeness, 
since they too were a source of colonial law, with the consequence that they acquired the same 
limited protection as local colonial statutes’.93 Nevertheless, the notion of repugnancy was only a 
live one when the relevant ‘colonial law’ was first validly made, and so the 1865 Act did not 
preclude a challenge to the validity of the 2004 Order.94 Nor did the subject matter of the Order – 
specifically, the fact that it related to colonial governance – in itself preclude judicial review: ‘one 
can readily accept that the colonial use of the prerogative power is for the most part beyond the 
reach of judicial review, but not that it is always or necessarily so.’95 In holding that the 2004 Order 
was unlawful by reason of being an abuse of process, the Court of Appeal took the view that it 
had been done not in the interests of BIOT, but rather of the United Kingdom: 
 
The governance of each colonial territory is in constitutional principle a discrete function 
of the Crown. That territory’s interests will not necessarily be the interests of the United 
Kingdom or of its allies. This is not to say that the two things are mutually exclusive: they 
will often, perhaps usually, be interdependent, so that the defence of a colony from attack, 
and even its use as a base to protect the United Kingdom, may serve both its and the 
United Kingdom’s interests. But that is not the case here…96 
 
On the first point the House of Lords agreed, holding that prerogative orders in council making 
provision for the OTs are in principle subject to judicial review: the 1865 Act did not immunise 
them against such review.97 So too, it is clear, might statutory orders in council be subject to such 
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review.98 Nevertheless, the Law Lords allowed the appeal of the FCO. First, it held, the Crown’s 
legislative power was plenary, not limited by the traditional formulation of ‘peace, order and good 
government’. To the extent that Bancoult (No 1) had suggested otherwise, it was wrong.99 Though 
it was accepted by all the Law Lords that some rights might be so fundamental as to limit the 
plenary power of the Crown, the majority held that the right of abode is not such a right. Second, 
the Order could not be invalid for being contrary to the interests of the Chagossian people, for 
there was no obligation to act on their behalf. ‘Her Majesty exercises her powers of prerogative 
legislation for a non-self-governing colony on the advice of her ministers in the United Kingdom’ 
said Lord Hoffmann, ‘and will act in the interests of her undivided realm, including both the United 
Kingdom and the colony.’100 What this means in practice is that the interest of the part might be – 
as they indeed seem to have been – sacrificed in pursuit of those of the whole: 
 
Her Majesty in Council is therefore entitled to legislate for a colony in the interests of the 
United Kingdom. No doubt she is also required to take into account the interests of the 
colony (in the absence of any previous case of judicial review of prerogative colonial 
legislation, there is of course no authority on the point) but there seems to me no doubt 
that in the event of a conflict of interest, she is entitled, on the advice of Her United 
Kingdom ministers, to prefer the interests of the United Kingdom.101 
 
Though the effect of the Bancoult litigation is to confirm the possibility of legal challenge to 
prerogative orders in council as they apply to Overseas Territories, much more was lost than won. 
The decision of the House of Lords demonstrates a number of points. First, the emptiness of even 
the minimal limits implied by the language – common to the instruments governing all of the OTs 
– of ‘peace, order and good governance’. Second, the poverty of fundamental rights discourse as 
it applies to those Territories – entirely compatible, the majority held, with the depopulation of the 
Islands. Third, and more generally, law might be made for those Territories, over the head of their 
inhabitants, in pursuit of the interests of an ‘undivided realm’ whose centre of political gravity sits 
many thousands of miles away. The logic at work in this decision is, palpably, the logic of 
Empire.102 And the decision in Bancoult (No 2) – which one would strain to call even a Pyrrhic 
victory103 – appears even less edifying once we remind ourselves of the underlying position 
whereby the rules governing such territories can in many cases be made without prior statutory 
authority and little or no democratic oversight. There is no democratic oversight in the imperial 
Parliament at Westminster, and none either in the representative organs of the overseas territory 
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in question (if such things even exist). To reaffirm: the power for the Queen in Council to make 
laws in exercise of the prerogative is reserved in relation to the majority of the OTs. Such orders 
in council are subject to no procedural obligations vis a vis Parliament, while statutory orders in 
council are in many cases subject only to the requirement that they be published after being made. 
 
The scale of the practice of prerogative legislation is presumably now small. Its extent, 
however, appears difficult and perhaps impossible to discern exactly, as there are very significant 
issues relating to the accessibility of prerogative orders in council, including to those most affected 
by them; issues which of course are a direct function of the procedural void in which they are 
made. These issues are of such gravity as to perhaps might call into question their status as law. 
Though it is not unique in this regard, the BIOT case is the most egregious example given the 
appalling treatment of the native people by the United Kingdom and the quantity of associated 
litigation. One study of the case outlines the position as to the accessibility of the relevant legal 
rules: 
 
There is no official website with authoritative copies of the legislation. The official 
government website for legislation has a small number of BIOT statutes, but none made 
under the Royal Prerogative … The one place that BIOT legislation is published is in the 
British Indian Ocean Territory Gazette. Once again, the Gazette is not available online. 
According to the FOI response from the FCO, the current total global distribution list of 
the Gazette is 20. Of these, 16 go to an emanation of the government. The remaining 4 
on the list are all British law libraries… One copy does go to Mauritius, but it is to the 
British High Commission there.’104 
 
Though the point is not always quite so vital as in the context of BIOT, a cursory search will 
demonstrate that the difficulty of obtaining legislation applies also in the context of the other 
Overseas Territories. The British Library’s guide to the research of legislation, for example, says 
this about prerogative orders in council: 
 
Other instruments, though not SIs, may be included in the annual volumes of these as a 
kind of appendix. Still others may be issued as parliamentary papers, printed in the London 
Gazette or reprinted in the British and Foreign State Papers, all of which are indexed. Some 
may be issued separately but many are unpublished in any form and are available only as 
original documents at the National Archives, where enrolled copies should be among the 
chancery records. More recent Orders in Council may be available directly from the Privy 
Council Office.105 
 
The problem is perhaps worse than this account may suggest, for prerogative orders in council 
often confer the power to make legislation on the Governor in lieu of a legislature. Such ordinances 
are, of course, subject to even more attenuated political control than are the orders under whose 
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authority they are made, with the intervention of the Queen in Council in relation to the latter 
acting to distinguish what is merely pseudo-democratic from what is entirely undemocratic.  
 
Even if one accepts the need to have broad law-making powers in relation to the Overseas 
Territories, in short, much might be done to improve the status quo. There is, for example, no 
reason that the making of such legislation could not be placed in its entirety upon a statutory 
footing. And – the previous example shows – this could easily be done without taking 
responsibility from the Privy Council, if it was desired to retain the distinction between what is 
done by the (British) executive and what is done by the Crown in Council. Nor would it be at all 
onerous to make prerogative legislation widely and easily available, by – for example – giving it the 
status of statutory instruments, and so making it subject to the relevant rules as to publication. The 
status quo, whereby new prerogative orders in council are published in a messy, unsearchable form 
on the website of the Privy Council, and older ones have disappeared into a juridical black hole, is 
completely intolerable. More ambitiously, but still straightforwardly, the making of orders in 
council, both statutory and prerogative, for the OTs might be made subject to the approval of 
Parliament. Provision might be made for the involvement, in some form, of the relevant 
institutions of the Territory in question. What the Bancoult litigation shows however, is that such 
formal improvements, no matter how urgent, will only go so far to improve the status quo. The 
issue of plenary legislative power for the territories within the prerogative, underpinned by the 
logic of an undivided realm is more dangerous, for it neatly encapsulates both the vulnerability of 
the territories and the persistence of the deep logic of Empire. The territories are separate when it 
suits the metropole – as when it comes to such matters as democratic accountability, or basic rule 
of law standards – but part of a single whole when it does not.  
 
It is also significant that prerogative orders in council are, unlike their statutory equivalent, 
primary legislation for the purposes of the Human Rights Act 1998.106 On this basis, it was argued 
in Bancoult that, having equal status to Acts of the Westminster Parliament, they were immune 
from review by the courts. This was – quite rightly – rejected. Whatever their formal status, 
prerogative orders in council lack the democratic character of Acts of Parliament: though such an 
order ‘may be legislative in character, it is still an exercise of power by the executive alone.’107 But 
the designation of these instruments as primary legislation by the HRA has related consequences: 
the courts have no power to strike them down, but may only – where appropriate – make a 
declaration of their incompatibility with the ECHR.108 Moreover, a prerogative order in council 
may provide a defence for a public authority which has been required by it – contrary to the general 
found in section 6 of the Act – to act incompatibly with the Convention Rights.109 This 
notwithstanding that there has been no Parliamentary oversight of their content and no Minister 
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has been required to make a statement of their compatibility with the Convention, as is required 
of Bills laid before Parliament.110 How, but also if, any incompatibility arising from a prerogative 
order in council is remedied is left to others to determine – not Parliament, but rather the executive, 
which will be permitted to act unilaterally in framing the remedy and in putting it before the 
monarch for approval.  
 
Given that one significant element of the use of prerogative orders in council relates to the 
governance of the Overseas Territories, the effect of what appears at first sight to be a relatively 
technical point about their status under the Human Rights Act reveals itself to be the potential 
source of great injustice, allowing the government of the day to both have its constitutional cake 
(by not subjecting prerogative orders in council to any form of direct democratic oversight) and 
eat it (by nevertheless insulating them from fundamental rights challenges as though they were an 
expression of Parliament’s clear will). It would be reasonable to identify, once more, a certain 
constitutional contempt for the OTs, again both given effect but also simultaneously hidden from 
domestic view by the institution of the Privy Council. To repeat the point made above in the 
relation to the judicial role of the Council: these legislative powers are not being exercised by the 
Privy Council in its entirety, with its absurdly large and eclectic membership. They are being 
exercised by the government of the day, the formal constitutional distinction serving most 
obviously to disguise the substantive continuity. The form of the Privy Council works to create an 
artificial separation between the domestic order and that which is the residue of Empire, hiding 
the latter from public view and, in the legislative case, providing cover for practices that the 
domestic constitution would rightly reject.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
It is not for nothing that the Privy Council attracts so little attention in the modern constitutional 
literature. It is much less important than it once was, having been transcended within the domestic 
constitution by a series of institutions which might be best understood as outgrowths of it. Its 
functions within the domestic constitution are residual, and mostly formal. Even those few which 
are of practical significance carried out in a fashion which is often considerably less visible, less 
accessible, than are their analogues in Parliament. But the Privy Council is not only, and not in the 
first place, an institution of the domestic constitution. Rather, it is better understood, both in the 
judicial and legislative senses, as representing the beating heart of what remains of the imperial 
constitution. Here, its functions are no more visible, no more accessible – in fact in many cases 
they are much less so – but are significantly more important. In relation to some of the Overseas 
Territories, almost all that there is by way of law derives directly from the operation of the Crown 
in Council and only indirectly, if at all, from that of the Crown in Parliament.  
 
Some of this is not just knowable, but in fact known – though the JCPC’s work in relation 
to the Commonwealth attracts much more attention than does that in relation to the Overseas 
Territories – but other elements are mostly closed off, hidden from the view even of constitutional 
 
110 See O’Connor (n 47) 15: ‘This is a problem of real substance: well beyond mere harmless and quaint 
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observers. The Privy Council acts as a constitutional firewall, keeping the residual Empire largely 
separate from the domestic constitution of the United Kingdom, even where the allegedly distinct 
institutions are in substance identical. The result is that the imperial constitution is a shadow 
constitution, eclipsed by a domestic constitution whose values it would if visible work to 
undermine. It is for this reasons that, notwithstanding its apparent constitutional insignificance, 
any attempt to remove the Privy Council from our constitutional order, or to turn its relative 
formality into absolute formality by depriving it of all substantive powers is highly unlikely. To do 
so would require the United Kingdom to grapple not only with the considerable constitutional 
legacy of Empire, but also with its ongoing reality.  
 
 
